Rounding Up Subversives, Detecting Conspiracies, and Determining Loyalty Editorial Note
Rounding Up Subversives, Detecting Conspiracies, and Determining Loyalty
John Jay played an early and central role in the effort to identify and apprehend enemies of the state of New York and of the new nation of which it was a part. As early as March 1776, reflecting resolutions of the Continental Congress, Jay wrote Alexander McDougall that “such as are notoriously disaffected” should be removed to some area where the enemy’s army was not apt to penetrate.1 A few months later, Jay found he was no longer able to attend Congress and that his time was instead absorbed by “plots, conspiracies, and chimeras dire.”2
Jay’s official entry into internal security investigations in New York began on 11 June 1776, when the provincial congress added him to a committee created on 5 June to deal with persons “dangerous and disaffected to the American cause” and “persons of equivocal character.” Its formation was partly in compliance with requests from the Continental Congress dated 6 October 1775 and 14 March 1776 that those who refused to associate to defend the United Colonies be disarmed and that each colony arrest and secure every person within it whose going at large might endanger the safety of the colony or the liberties of America. More immediately, it was a response to reports that a “hostile armament” would soon arrive there, “whereby it hath become highly expedient and necessary to provide that the inhabitants . . . employed in repelling a foreign invasion, be not injured or annoyed by domestic enemies.” The council prepared a list of suspect persons to be arrested and brought before the committee. It directed the committee to inquire whether the suspects had afforded aid to the British fleet, persuaded others not to associate for the common defense, decried the value of Continental money, or otherwise interfered with the safety measures adopted by the provincial congress. Both this committee and country and district committees could also take action against suspects not yet specifically named by the council. However, little action had yet been taken by 10 June, when mobs began to seize Loyalists, tarring and feathering some, riding others on rails, and publicly humiliating and tormenting others in various ways. Following complaints by the Continental army to the provincial congress about these disorders and the state’s ineffectiveness in handling the disaffected, the composition of the committee for handling the disaffected was changed; Jay was among those then added.3
On 17 June the provincial congress created a secret committee consisting of Jay, Philip Livingston, and Gouverneur Morris “to confer with Genl. Washington relative to certain secret intelligence communicated to this Congress, and take such examinations relative thereto as they shall think proper.” There was much to discuss and considerable need for action. They had just received an alarming revelation from Isaac Ketchum (or Ketcham), one of a group of counterfeiters arrested in Cold Spring Harbor in May 1776 and held in the New York City jail, who had agreed to turn informer in exchange for clemency. Ketchum reported that two of his fellow inmates, Thomas Hickey and Michael Lynch, boasted of belonging to a “corps” paid by the British fleet. Hickey and Lynch were Continental soldiers arrested for trying to pass counterfeit currency, but they now appeared to be involved in much more serious crimes.4
The appointment of Jay to investigate what became known as the Hickey Plot was logical, because Ketchum had addressed his 8 June offer of information solely to Jay (see below). Once the provincial congress heard Isaac Ketchum’s testimony on 17 June, events moved rapidly. Jay and his two associates began examining suspects on 18 June and heard testimony that Governor William Tryon was enlisting men to aid the British fleet when it landed in New York. Not mentioned in the official depositions and other records of the investigation, but widely circulating around the city, were rumors that the conspirators were involved in a plot to kill or kidnap Washington, blow up the powder magazine in New York, and destroy the island’s link to the mainland at Kings Bridge.5
On 20 June, responding to Jay’s report of 18 June that his committee had discovered persons who ought to be arrested, the provincial congress authorized the secret committee to cause dangerous persons “to be apprehended and secured in such manner as they may think most prudent” and stated “that they have authority either to employ the militia or obtain detachments of Continental troops from the Commander in Chief for that purpose.” The provincial congress had empowered the committee to employ Continental troops to make arrests, because it believed calling out the militia for that purpose would be both expensive and so conspicuous that it would warn individuals about to be apprehended. Therefore, when Jay and his fellow investigators wanted to arrest David Matthews, mayor of New York City, they asked Washington to act for them.6
The secret committee issued warrants for the arrest of those named in testimony on the case as well as those whom the council had previously listed as dangerously disaffected and who were deemed unlikely to respond to subpoenas to appear before the committee on the disaffected. Continental troops, particularly those under the authority of Nathanael Greene in Brooklyn, rounded up the suspects. Matthews, the most important of the malefactors, was arrested in a 1:00 am raid on 22 June and examined the next day.7
Asserting that courts created under royal authority were not a proper venue for trying Continental army soldiers accused of going over to the British, the provincial congress turned Hickey and the other accused guards over to the army for trial by court-martial. Hickey, more recalcitrant than the other accused guardsmen, was tried and convicted unanimously on 26 June and publicly hanged before amassed Continental troops and townspeople on 28 June. In reporting the plot that day to John Hancock, president of the Continental Congress, Washington downplayed its significance, stating that
no regular plan seems to have been digested but several persons have been enlisted and sworn to join them. . . . The plot had been communicated to some of the Army, and part of my Guard engaged in It—Thomas Hicky one of them . . . by the unanimous opinions of a Court Martial is sentenced to die, having Inlisted himself and engaged others. . . . I am hopefull this example will produce many salutary consequences and deter others from entering into the like traiterous practices.
On 27 June, Jay brought before the council the evidence collected by the secret committee and was given leave to sit again to complete the business. Jay expressed fear in his 1 July letter to Robert R. Livingston that prosecution of Matthews and the other suspects would be unreasonably delayed by the sudden adjournment of the provincial congress following the arrival of the British fleet on 29 June. Jay was unduly pessimistic on this score, because the task was completed by 18 July, when a report was issued on the disposition of the cases.8
In the meantime, news of the Declaration of Independence arrived in July, and the provincial council appointed Jay to the committee to make the response. The resulting resolutions, penned by Jay, are printed below. At that point, on 9 July, the council combined the committee on disaffected persons with the secret committee appointed to confer with Washington on the conspiracy, released Washington and his army from the task of apprehending and securing disaffected persons, assigned that job to the new committee, and granted it the power to deal with prisoners (other than prisoners of war). Jay, however, was excused from the committee and assigned to a new secret committee to arrange for Hudson River defense.9
Writing the combined committee on 13 July, Washington explained that the pressure of events had prevented him from proceeding in the case of the other soldiers confined for seditious and treasonable practices, but he promised to take care of it when time would admit. (No record of what became of the other arrested guardsmen has been found.) However, Washington wanted the committee to take action against the civilians it had confined, for “They certainly are to be deemed the principals, & Justice to the inferiour Agents while the others pass unnoticed, I observe only excites Compassion and Censure.” He requested the secret committee, which wanted to parole many of those arrested, to remove the disaffected prisoners from the city and its environs as quickly as possible. He argued that not removing them would leave the city open to spies and emissaries from the enemy and facilitate their intelligence. He also warned that “A suspicion that there are many ministerial Agents among us would Justly alarm Soldiers of more Experience & Discipline than ours & I foresee very dangerous Consequences . . . if a Remedy to the Evil is not soon & efficaciously applied.”10
Jay believed that the disparity in penalties between military and civil law regarding treason should be corrected, and on 16 July the provincial convention passed a motion he proposed prescribing the death penalty for treason. On 18 July seventeen men linked to the Hickey investigation, including David Matthews and several of the counterfeiters, were convicted of “Treasonable practices against the States of America” but were exiled to Connecticut, not hanged. Over the next months, many other Loyalists were seized, investigated, and either jailed, exiled, or paroled, usually under the auspices of local committees. In at least two cases, the disaffected were hanged. Jay, however, was not directly involved during that time.11
In August, Matthews wrote to his old friend John McKesson, secretary of the provincial congress, seeking another hearing to enable him to contradict “a most hellish report that has been propagated, and is verily believed throughout this Colony, that I was concerned in a plot to assassinate General Washington and blow up the Magazine in New York. . . . The Convention well know that such a report prevails. They also know it is as false as hell is false.” No new hearing was held, and Matthews subsequently escaped from prison along with most of the others sent to Connecticut.12
On 21 September 1776, the convention, noting that the state was invaded by a powerful army at its capital and threatened with the incursions of another army, attended with “a host of savages,” on its northern and western frontiers, declared themselves required by the great law of self-preservation to create a committee for the express purpose of “inquiring into, detecting and defeating all conspiracies” that might be formed in the state against the “liberties of America.” The committee was empowered to send for persons and papers, to call out detachments of militia or troops deemed necessary for suppressing insurrections, to apprehend, secure, and remove all persons judged dangerous, and to enjoin secrecy on their own members and on persons they employed. They were required to retain minutes of their proceedings, expenditures, examinations, and other actions for submission to the council or future legislatures when called upon. Local committees were to forward such information as they received to the state committee. Jay was appointed to serve on the committee along with William Duer, Charles De Witt, Leonard Gansevoort, and Zephaniah Platt; Nathaniel Sackett was subsequently added.13
On 6 January 1777, Jay, then the chairman, reported on behalf of the Committee for Detecting Conspiracies a digest of its proceedings in the case of Loyalist Cadwallader Colden II.14 He quoted from the committee minutes for 1 January 1777, which noted that the state was under invasion and that a large number of persons who affected neutrality had gone over to the enemy. Jay argued that it was reasonable to suspect that persons who currently affected principles of neutrality only awaited “an opportunity of pursuing a similar conduct with those who have at last thrown off the mask, and taken an active part with our enemies.” It was too dangerous to hazard an “ill-timed act of lenity to individuals, who have either artful and wicked designs, or from interested motives shrink from the duties they owe their country.” Therefore, his committee recommended a resolution that persons of influence and of equivocal character be removed from the frontiers and such other places where conspiracies were forming to one of the neighboring states.15 In March 1777 the New York Convention prescribed an oath to be taken by those confined or banished as “disaffected persons”; those who refused to take the oath were to be sent behind the British lines. In May it offered pardon even to those who had been guilty of treasonable practices, if they took the oath of allegiance. Again the alternative was banishment.16 On 6 June, Jay reported to Sarah Livingston Jay (below) that “The Tories desert in great numbers to take the benefit of our act of grace.” Although Jay favored having subsequent loyalty investigations turned over to newly established state courts, treason cases came largely under the jurisdiction of military courts-martial.17
The documents reproduced below on the Hickey plot, on the spy activities of Enoch Crosby, and on the investigations of Jay’s former friends or neighbors, Colden, Peter Van Schaack, and Beverly Robinson, in later sections of this volume, provide insight into how loyalty investigations were conducted up to the point when the conspiracy committee was replaced by a commission in February 1777. They demonstrate that during the early stages of the Revolution, New York’s leaders, and Jay in particular, wrestled with familiar and recurring security issues: military versus civil jurisdiction, arrest on mere suspicion, preventive detention, use of loyalty oaths, requirements that people inform on others, investigation by legislative committees rather than formal courts, and lack of representation by lawyers and of other forms of due process, including, in some cases, lack of any formal charges lodged or of information on accusations made.18 It is significant that during the early stages of the Revolution, despite lack of experience in government and the extreme nature of the emergency, so much thought and effort were given to legal and procedural issues and so much effort was applied to balance the need for deterrence of “disloyalty” with the need to conciliate the citizenry and avoid promoting disaffection through harsh and arbitrary treatment.
1. JJ to McDougall, 21 Mar. 1776, above.
2. JJ to Edward Rutledge, 6 July 1776, below.
3. Bruce Bliven, Under the Guns: New York, 1775–1776 (New York, 1972), 282–83; Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker, Father Knickerbocker Rebels (New York, 1948), 80–82.
4. , 1: 495–97.
5. Statements that the Hickey Plot included a plan to kill or kidnap Washington and/or other staff officers appear in various newspaper accounts of the period, including the Constitutional Gazette, 29 June 1776, and “Extract of a letter from New-York, dated June 24, 1776,” printed in the Pennsylvania Packet; or, The General Advertiser, 1 July 1776, and the Continental Journal (Boston), 4 July 1776. A Loyalist pamphlet published in London in 1776 based on what purported to be testimony taken by the committee investigating the plot (none of whose members matched anyone actually involved in the investigation) referred to a half-baked plot to capture Washington while he was visiting an alleged mistress who was collaborating with the British (Minutes of the Trial and Examination of Certain Persons, in the Province of New York, Charged with being engaged in a Conspiracy against the Authority of the Congress and the Liberties of America [London: J. Bew, 1776]). As noted below, Mayor David Matthews mentioned involvement in such an abortive plot in his statements regarding his Loyalist claims after the war.
For newspaper accounts referring to the conspiracy but with no specific reference to a plot against Washington, see the notice datelined New York, 27 June, printed in the Continental Journal of 4 July, the New England Chronicle of 4 July, and the Essex Journal of 5 July 1776; and a notice regarding the hanging, appearing in the New-York Gazette; and the Weekly Mercury, 1 July 1776, and in the Pennsylvania Packet of 8 July 1776.
Nineteenth-century stories of the foiling of Hickey’s scheme to poison Washington’s peas by a daughter of tavernkeeper Samuel Fraunces who exposed the plan seem to have originated in the writings of Benson J. Lossing (see Washington and the American Republic [New York, 1870], 2: 175–76). Lossing identified her as the woman referred to in the “Extract of a letter from New-York, dated June 24, 1776” that recounted the roundup of many Tories accused of a “hellish plot” and mentioned that “Yesterday the General’s Housekeeper was taken up, it is said she is concerned.” Lossing claimed “Those facts were related to a friend of the writer (Mr. W[illiam]. J. Davis, a member of New-York Historical Society) by the late Peter Embury, of New York, who resided in the city at the time, was well acquainted with the general’s housekeeper, and was present at the execution of Hickey.” Lossing had presented the story in an earlier paper on “Washington’s Life Guard,” read before the New-York Historical Society 5 Jan. 1858 and printed in the Historical Magazine, and Notes and Queries Concerning the Antiquities 2 (May 1858): 5 (APS Online). The story was repeated in “Washington’s Attitude Towards ‘Native Americans’ and ‘Foreigners’—His Army: How Composed,” American Catholic Historical Researches 17 (October 1900): 4. A similar story also appeared in Washington Irving’s Life of Washington (New York, 1857), 2: 247, which quoted as an example of the rumors circulating at the time of the Hickey Plot a letter from a Reverend John Marsh of Wethersfield, Conn., of 9 July 1776: “About ten days before any of the conspirators were taken up, a woman went to the general and desired a private audience. He granted it to her, and she let him know that his life was in danger, and gave him such an account of the conspiracy as gained his confidence.” None of these stories, which may have helped preserve the identity of the real informer, appear in the records of the secret committee or in Washington’s papers; they are generally dismissed as “entirely groundless” by prominent Washington biographers; see, for example, , 4: 121n.
6. , 1: 477, 500.
7. Testimony had implicated the mayor’s brother in the conspiracy; the secret committee issued a warrant for Fletcher Matthews, then rescinded it upon learning that James Matthews was the brother meant. See the warrant for Fletcher Matthews, 21 June 1776, and Washington to James Clinton, 27 June 1776, , 5: 72–73, 116–18.
For other examples of the secret committee’s warrants for arrests of Hickey Plot suspects and also of a group of Loyalists on Long Island who had taken up arms against the Revolutionary government, see Secret Committee Warrant for the Arrest of John Campbell, 22 June, below; warrant for Peter McLean, 22 June, NN (EJ: 1052); warrant for David Baulding, 22 June, NjR (EJ: 13158); warrant for George Brewerton, 22 June, , 1: 240–41. These and other records of the secret committee’s arrests are printed in , 6: 1162. On the raids against the disaffected on Long Island, see , 4: 357–58; 5: 86.
8. , 5: 112–13, 134–35; , 1: 498, 500, 509, 530; , 6: 1158, 1164–66; proceedings of the court-martial, 26 June, Washington Papers, series 4, DLC.
9. , 1: 518.
10. , 5: 298–99, 313–14, 327–28.
11. , 1: 496–97, 527, 530; FAA, 4th ser., 6: 1084–88, 1118–20.
12. The Loyalist pamphlet cited in note 5, above, detailed an investigation by the fictitious committee against Matthews and others, incorporating the story of a plot against Washington in ways that would defame Washington and discredit the investigators. Matthews’s letter to John McKesson is quoted in Edward Floyd De Lancey’s notes to Thomas Jones’s History of New York, 2: 416. Matthews removed after the war to the island of Cape Breton, where he served as president of the council and commander in chief. He reported an abortive plot to seize Washington in his statements regarding his Loyalist claims in August 1784. , 2: 51–52; Egerton, Royal Commission, 168; PGW: Rev. War. Series, 5: 73–74.
13. , 1: 638–39.
15. , 1: 762.
16. See William Duer to JJ, 3 Jan. 1777, below.
17. Resolve of New York Convention, 1 Apr. 1777, , no. 43313; , 1: 690–91.
18. For fuller discussions, see , 82, 90–92; , 59–60, 70–72; , 169–75; Milton M. Klein, “John Jay and the Revolution,” New York History 51 (2000): 19–30, esp. 27–29; Philip Ranlet, The New York Loyalists (Knoxville, 1986), 141–60, esp. 156–57; 4: 115–21.