One of Adams’s most significant achievements as American minister to the Dutch Republic had been his negotiation of loans to the United States with the consortium of Wilhem & Jan Willink, Nicolaas & Jacob van Staphorst, and de la Lande & Fynje.1 In 1783, de la Lande & Fynje organized, under its own management, a group of Dutch houses interested in trade with the United States, including the Willinks and Van Staphorsts, into the North American Trade Association. As with the loans to the United States managed by the consortium, each member was responsible only for the amount of its own investment. When the association proved unable to compete with British firms in providing desirable merchandise and long-term credit, de la Lande & Fynje then formed a partnership with a London merchant, Frederick William Geyer, for which the Dutch association was to provide two-thirds of the capital. To meet its commitments to the partnership with Geyer, de la Lande & Fynje used proceeds of the Dutch loan of 1784.

Postwar trade with the United States faltered, leading to the bankruptcy of many European firms. When de la Lande & Fynje suspended payments on its private obligations and on those of the North American Trade Association in June 1785, the Willinks and Van Staphorsts disclaimed any responsibility for its obligations to the United States. Adams notified the Board of Treasury (Walter Livingston, Samuel Osgood, and Arthur Lee) of the firm’s bankruptcy in a letter of 2 July in which he defended his decision to include de la lande & Fynje in the loan consortium. He also mentioned that he had learned that several American firms held considerable property belonging to it. Noting that he had been told that the firm’s property could not be attached because it had been conveyed to Geyer, who had shipped goods to America, he advised the treasury board to examine the issue, and do what it could to secure the interest of the United States by attaching the firm’s property if possible.2

On 2 Sept. Walter Livingston told Congress that he had learned about de la Lande & Fynje’s bankruptcy the previous evening from a “Respectable mercantile House” in New York and that he had immediately taken measures to attach its property in the hands of Duncan Ingraham Jr. of Philadelphia, Shaler & Seaver in New York, and William Foster & Co. in Boston.3 Congress retroactively ratified Livingston’s decision by instructing the board to take whatever measures were needed to secure the monies due the United States from de la Lande & Fynje. Subsequently, the board ordered the Van Staphorsts to pay all American funds in their hands to the Willinks.4

Meanwhile, the majority of the firm’s European creditors had reached an agreement to transfer to Daniel Parker all the American assets of de la Lande & Fynje and Geyer, which Parker securitized with American debt certificates he held.5 These creditors then petitioned Dutch authorities to freeze the bankrupt firm’s assets in America, fearing that its nonconcurring creditors would attempt to seize them. Dutch authorities instructed Van Berckel to petition Congress to prevent the attachment of the firm’s property by any unauthorized Dutch subject, and to secure the annulment of any seizures that had already been made. On 9 February 1786, Van Berckel addressed a note to JJ to this effect.6

The Van Staphorsts considered the board’s order an affront to their good credit and responsibility and prejudicial to both the United States and themselves. They challenged its authority to remove them from management of the loan and refused to comply with the order. They stated that since they had received no notice of Lee’s appointment, it would be unwise to comply with his orders, especially since they were contrary to the congressional resolution of 15 February 1785 regarding disposition of the funds, and to their contract with the United States. Instead they deposited the loan’s funds in their hands in the Bank of Amsterdam to the joint credit of themselves and the Willinks, and so informed Jay in a lengthy letter of complaint. Suspecting, perhaps, that Adams had impugned their reputation, the Staphorsts described him as inexperienced in finance and criticized his management of the negotiations for the loans of 1782 and 1784, especially his determination to include de la Lande & Fynje in the consortium. They then noted that the practice of “partial Attachments, holding in almost every Part of America,” which gave American creditors an advantage over foreigners, served only to damage American credit and Congress’s reputation for good faith. Furthermore, they said, it had injured Dutch lenders who had already supported American credit, and constituted an insuperable obstacle to a more convenient and successful resolution of the crisis. For this reason, they said, they had advised the treasury board not to attach the property of de la Lande & Fynje. If, after considering the explanation they had provided, the board was still determined to attempt to dispossess them of their commission to manage the loan, they said, they hoped Jay would ask Congress to reverse the order removing them from the management of the Dutch loans.7 Jay complied with this request and, by April 1786, the issue was resolved to the satisfaction of Congress and the firm.8