The Barbary States: A Problem with No Ready Solution: Editorial Note
The Barbary States: A Problem with No Ready Solution
One of the early crises Jay had to confront as Secretary for Foreign Affairs was the capture of American vessels and crews by the Barbary States (Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli), because, with independence, American shipping was no longer covered by the sea passes that Britain had purchased from these powers. Anticipating this difficulty, the American negotiators had persuaded the French to include an article in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1778 that pledged France to attempt to protect Americans from attacks and depredations by the Barbary States. The United States derived no substantive benefit from this provision, however.1 Once independent, it had three options for dealing with the Barbary States: purchasing treaties with them, waging war against them, or persuading one of the European powers to protect its vessels. Without waiting for diplomacy to settle the issue, American shippers either counterfeited Mediterranean passes or used subterfuge to purchase them from foreign contacts.2
Surprisingly, in the early years of the war, the Emperor of Morocco had taken the initiative in developing a peaceful relationship with the United States. Under his instruction, Etienne d’Audibert Caille, a private merchant operating out of the Moroccan city of Salé, made an initial contact with the American commissioners in April 1778, on behalf of the sultan or emperor of Morocco, Sidi Muhammad Ibn Abdallah, and in September 1779 d’Audibert Caille announced that he had been designated to represent the emperor with the Americans. On French advice, the commissioners did not respond to his offer, although they forwarded his letter to Congress. In April 1780, having heard nothing, d’Audibert Caille contacted Jay who acknowledged his letter, sent it to Congress on 30 November 1780, and obtained its authorization to correspond with him. No negotiations were held prior to Jay’s return to the United States, although Congress did, on 7 May 1784, apologize for the delay in responding, authorize the American commissioners in Europe to acknowledge the Moroccan ruler’s initiative, and empower them to negotiate treaties. Before this decision was implemented, Sidi Muhammad, annoyed at the apparent lack of response, decided to force the issue by authorizing the seizure of an American vessel, the Betsey, taken off the coast of Cadiz on 11 October 1784.3
John Adams was the first to suggest the shape American policy should take. While some might consider American trade in the Mediterranean not worth the expense of treaties with the Barbary States, he argued, the price of not making them would far outweigh the cost of the “presents” required to conclude them.4 He admitted, however, that it would be difficult to find the sums required to satisfy American obligations to France and the United Provinces as well as the cost of diplomacy with the North African rulers.5 Unaware of how costly the treaties would be, on 14 February 1785, Congress authorized the American commissioners in Europe to appoint persons to carry on the negotiations with the Barbary States and to expend up to $80,000 to conclude them, an amount far below their rulers’ demands.6
On 11 March Jay entrusted his instruction to the American commissioners and Congress’s order to prosecute the matter expeditiously to John Lamb, a private individual who had come highly recommended to Congress by the governor of Connecticut. Lamb did not reach Paris as soon as expected.7 By the time he arrived, Adams and Jefferson had commissioned Thomas Barclay to conduct negotiations with Morocco, with whom a treaty was eventually negotiated;8 and Spain had purchased a very expensive peace with Algeria in 1785, a peace that opened the Atlantic to Algerian corsairs and led to immediate captures of American vessels.9
On 6 August, John Paul Jones reported to Jay that Algeria had declared war on the United States.10 Jay immediately concluded that the Spanish-Algerine treaty, along with those already in place with other European powers, made prospects for an affordable treaty between Algeria and the United States highly unlikely, since Algerian corsairs would now have only American and Portuguese shipping to cruise against. He informed the President of Congress of these developments in a letter of 13 October, on which Congress ordered him to report.11
Jay’s report of 20 October 1785, below, strongly recommended against any attempt to purchase protection for American shipping which should, he said, be armed and ready to respond to any attack. He also suggested sending a minister or envoy to negotiate a mutual defense pact between the United States and Portugal that would commit each nation to refrain from negotiating a separate peace with the pirate nations.12 Early in 1786, Adams and Jefferson began negotiations for a treaty of amity and commerce with Portugal under instructions from Congress of 7 May 1784, but, since Congress did not act promptly on Jay’s report, their discussions did not include issues related to the Barbary states.13
Lafayette also involved himself in the effort to devise a strategy for dealing with the Barbary pirates. On 28 October 1786, he sent Jay a proposal that he, Jefferson, and d’Estaing had developed for an anti-piratical confederation of nations not protected by treaties with the Barbary States. Jay forwarded it to the President of Congress on 15 February 1787.14 On 27 July, Congress considered a motion made by William Grayson, acting under instructions from Virginia, to direct Jefferson to take the lead in forming such a confederation. The motion was approved and sent to Jay. In his report of 2 August, he recalled that he had previously recommended that the United States should always prefer war to tribute, but he warned that the United States could not provide the seamen and resources it would be expected to contribute because the Confederation government could not raise the revenue to pay for them.15 As Jay anticipated, the problems with the remaining three Barbary States could be solved only by force after the United States had successfully addressed its constitutional inadequacies.
1. For JJ’s instructions to the American commissioners to seek French assistance on the basis of the guarantee in the Franco-American treaty of commerce of 1778, see JJ to the American Commissioners, 11 Mar. 1785, above. For his discussions with Vergennes on the Barbary situation, see TJ to JJ, 23 May 1786, below. For France’s refusal to honor her treaty pledge, see 18: 376; and 3: 122–23.
2. On the Mediterranean passes, see John Temple to JJ, 7 June 1786, 3: 192; JJ to the President of Congress, 19 June 1786, 30: 351; and 9 May 1787, below; and JJ to Temple, 5 July 1786, below.
3. See 26: 285–86; 29: 558; 2: 66–69, 358–59, 451. Morocco claimed to have been the first nation to recognize the independence of the United States in an instruction from the Emperor of 20 Dec. 1777. See Priscilla H. Roberts and James N. Tull, “Moroccan Sultan Sidi Muhammad Ibn Abdallah’s Diplomatic Initiatives toward the United States, 1777–1786,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 143, no. 2 (June 1999): 233–65; and 26: 361–62.
4. For comments on the costs to American trade, see Bingham to JJ, 12 Feb. 1785, above. Goods from all regions of the country were carried to the Mediterranean. Thus, defense of the commerce was not a sectional issue. See 18: 370–71.
5. See JA to JJ, 15 Dec. 1784, 3: 650–52. TJ suggested two options: Americans could withdraw from the carrying trade (a possibility JJ mentioned in the report below), or they could attempt to form a league with a number of small, non-treaty European nations to cruise the Mediterranean or blockade the ports of the Barbary nations. See TJ to JJ, 23 May 1786, below; and 9: 500; 12: 177; and 18: 377–78.
6. See JJ to the American Commissioners in Europe, 11 Mar. 1785, above; 16: 559–65, 572–74, 579–81; and 28: 65–66. JJ also wrote to Giacomo Crocco, an associate of d’Audibert Caille and of Robert Montgomery, another private individual who had attempted to present himself as authorized to represent the United States to the Moroccan ruler, to explain the delay in the American response to Sidi Muhammed’s initiative and to ask for the release of American captives and a cessation of hostilities until duly authorized American commissioners could begin negotiations with Morocco. See JJ to Crocco, 11 Mar. 1785, Dft, DNA: PCC, item 98, 313–15 (EJ: 13303); C, DNA: PCC, item 81, 91–93 (EJ: 3819); LbkC, , 1: 25–28 (EJ: 2404). For the treaty of peace between Morocco and the United States, signed by TJ on 1 Jan. and submitted to Congress by JJ on 12 Apr. 1787, see Barclay to JJ, 30 July 1786, below; JJ’s Report on the Treaty with Morocco, 5 May 1787, DS, DNA: PCC, item 81: 3: 109–12 (EJ: 3949); 3: 227–33, 237; 32: 176, 273–74; and 24: 220, 364–65, 392. For Rufus King’s report that European nations usually paid $200,000 annually to the Barbary States, see 23: 3. JA reported that Barclay had drawn on him for more money than he had expected to cover the cost of presents and other expenses for concluding the treaty. See JA to JJ, 23 May 1787, ALS, DNA: PCC, item 84, 6: 481–84. For TJ’s attention to the captives and his attempts to involve the French Order of the Holy Trinity for the Redemption of the Captives, known as Mathurins after their founder, St. John of Matha, to assist in the redemption of American captives, see TJ to JJ, 1 Feb. 1787, PrC, DLC (EJ: 10141); LbkC, DNA: PCC, item 107, 1: 424–29; 11: 99–100; TJ to JJ, 4 May, below, and JJ to the President of Congress, 12 Sept. 1788, LS, DNA: PCC, item 80, 3: 577–80 (EJ: 364); Dft, NNC (EJ: 5846); LbkC, , 3: 443–44 (EJ: 2317); 34: 523–24.
7. Lamb’s suitability for negotiations with the Algerians, to which Monroe mistakenly claimed that JJ had testified, was later called into question. JJ received Lamb’s petition and memorial on 9 Feb. along with a number of other papers sent by CT as JJ was setting up the Office of Foreign Affairs. See the for February 1785 (EJ 3748). In a report to Congress of 10 Feb. 1785, DNA: PCC, item 81, 5–7 (EJ: 3811), JJ remarked that Lamb might “probably be employed” as an agent by the American commissioners; but in his letter to the American Commissioners of 11 Mar. he wrote that “Capt. Lamb has no Encouragement either from them [Congress] or from me to expect that he will be employed, it being intended to leave you in the full and uninfluenced Exercise of your Discretion in appointing the Agent in Question.” Since Lamb had informed him that he intended to go to Paris, JJ continued, he had decided to entrust him with the present letter because he was “persuaded that he will be as faithful a Bearer of it as any other Person.” See JJ to the American Commissioners, 11 Mar. 1785, above; 9: 187; 18: 385–87; 22: 255, 290; 23: 92–93, 192–99; and Lawrence A. Peskin, Captives and Countrymen: Barbary Slavery and the American Public, 1785–1816 (Baltimore, 2009), 97–102.
8. For Barclay’s role in concluding a treaty with Morocco, see Barclay to JJ, 30 July 1786, below; and 148–218.
9. On the cost of Spain’s treaty, see JA to JJ, 22 Feb. 1786, below; 23: 313; and 9: 529. For his sense that the United States could count on Spain’s good offices and his report on the arrival of Lamb, see Carmichael to JJ, 9–26 Dec. 1785, below; and Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers: 1776–1816 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1931), 37–40.
10. JJ forwarded Jones’s letter of 6 Aug., above, advising that Algiers had declared war on the United States, to the president of Congress on 13 Oct. (see note 11, below), and to the governors of the states on 14 Oct. 1785 (LS, RPB [EJ: 5266]). See also his report to Congress, 20 Oct. 1785, below. There was no formal declaration of war. Immediately after the conclusion of their treaty with Spain, the Algerians began cruising against American ships. On 27 July they captured the Maria, Captain Isaac Stephens, and on 30 July, the Dauphin, Captain Richard O’Bryen, taking a total of twenty-one American captives. See JJ’s report on American Prisoners in Algiers, 2 Jan. 1786, 3: 58–59.
11. See Jones to JJ, 6 Aug., and JJ to the President of Congress (Richard Henry Lee), 13 Oct, LS, DNA: PCC, item 80, 37–39 (EJ: 157); Dft, NNC (EJ: 5776); C, DNA: PCC, item 78, 13: 355 (EJ: 5152); LbkC, , 1: 498–99 (EJ: 1796); 29: 831–34; and for a similar appraisal of the situation, JJ to JA, 14 Oct. 1785. For JA’s doubt that negotiations with the Barbary powers would be successful, see JA to JJ, 6 Dec. 1785, below. For JJ’s suggestions about additions to a treaty with Portugal, see the editorial note: “Portuguese-American Diplomacy,” below. Congress did not consider JJ’s report until 29 Mar. 1786. The committee assigned to it reported on 5 Apr. and recommended obtaining a loan to be used to secure American commerce against depredations from the Barbary states and creation of a Marine Department. Its report was debated on 2 May 1786. See 23: 221–22, 256, 257n2. For suggestions by William Grayson and Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, and by John Bondfield, commercial agent at Bordeaux, that Britain or other European powers had influenced the Algerines to “Check the progress of the American navigation,” see 22: 683, 692; DNA: PCC, item 92, 455 (EJ: 5174). In his Observations on the Commerce of the American States, Sheffield declared that it was not in the interest of any maritime power to protect the Americans from the Barbary corsairs. See Richard B. Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary: A Diplomatic History (Gainesville, Fla., 2004), 35.
In January 1786, Floridablanca suggested that, had the negotiations Gardoqui was currently conducting with JJ been successful, Spain would have used its good offices with the Moroccans and the Algerians on behalf of the United States. He recommended that Americans be made aware that Spain could frustrate all American commerce in European waters and in the Mediterranean, since it held both the Moroccans and the Algerians at its disposition. Gardoqui subsequently conveyd this message to JJ. See Gardoqui to JJ, 25 May 1786; the editorial note “Negotiations with Gardoqui Reach an Impasse”; and JJ’s report to Congress of 3 Aug. 1786, all below. Despite the implied threat, however, Floridablanca offered to facilitate Barclay’s negotiations with Morocco by providing letters of recommendation from the King and himself, and indicated to Carmichael that Spain would continue its “good Offices” on behalf of the United States with the Barbary states. See Carmichael to JJ, 2 Sept. 1786, ALS, DNA: PCC, item 88, 468–72; 9: 352, 365–66, 384; 10: 362, 535; and 3: 79–80, 290–91.
12. Neither nation had purchased a peace treaty from the Barbary States.
13. See JA to JJ, 26 Feb.; JA and TJ to JJ, 28 Mar. 1786 and JJ’s report on this letter and Charles Pinckney’s motion on it, 29 May 1786, both below; JA to JJ, 20 Feb. 1786, in 3: 99–101; TJ to JJ, 23 May 1786, below; and 23: 306.
14. See JJ to the President of Congress, 15 Feb. 1787, RC, DNA; PCC, item 80, 3: 185 (EJ: 273); 32: 65; 24: 274.
15. See JJ’s report of 2 Aug. 1787, below; 32: 419; and 24: 539. On the inability of the Confederation government to maintain a peacetime naval establishment, see Elizabeth M. Nuxoll, “The Naval Movement of the Confederation Era,” in The Early Republic and the Sea, eds. William S. Dudley and Michael J. Crawford (Washington, D.C., 2001), 3–33.