The hon. Mr. Jay rose, and said that he would confine himself to a few remarks, as the question had been pretty fully debated. He begun with a description of the general characteristics of a government proper for the United States. It had, he said, been justly laid down, that a government, which was to accomplish national purposes, should command the national resources. Here a question had been raised— Would it be proper that the state governments should limit the powers of the general government, relative to its supplies? Would it be right or politic that the sovereign power of a nation should depend, for support, on the mere will of the several members of that nation; that the interest of a part should take place of that of the whole; or that the partial views of one of the members should interfere with and defeat the views of all? He said that, after the most mature reflection, he could see no possible impropriety in the general government having access to all the resources of the country. With respect to direct taxes, it appeared to him that the proposed amendment would involve great difficulties. Suppose a state should refuse to comply—would not the same motives, the same reasons, which produced the noncompliance, induce such state to resist the imposing and collecting of the tax? Would not a number of states in similar circumstances be apt to unite to give their resistance weight?— They could not all be forced.— These ideas of the impracticability and the danger of the measure, he said, had been already fully illustrated, and they had made a deep impression on his mind.— He apprehended that ambitious men might be found, in such emergencies, ready to take advantage of turbulent times, and put themselves at the head of such an association. After dwelling some time on this point, he proceeded to take notice of the objection relative to the want of that particular information in members of Congress, which, it had been said, would alone render them capable of imposing taxes, with prudence and justice. The objection had some weight; but it ought to be considered, that direct taxes were of two kinds; general and specific— With respect to the latter, the objection could not apply. The national government would, without doubt, usually embrace those objects, which were uniform throughout the states: such as all specific articles of luxury. No particular, minute knowledge could be necessary for this. For example; What difficulty or partiality would there be in the operation of a tax of twenty shillings on all coaches? The objection then could only apply to the laying of general taxes upon all property. But the difficulty on this score, he said, might be easily remedied. The legislatures of the several states would furnish their delegates with their systems of revenue, and give them the most particular information, with regard to the modes of taxation most agreeable to the people. From the comparison of these, Congress would be able to form a general system, as perfect as the nature of things would admit. He appealed to the good sense and candour of the gentlemen, if this would not, in all probability, take place. After some considerations on the subject of concurrent jurisdiction, he said, he was convinced, that it was sufficiently secured and established in the constitution. But as gentlemen were of a different opinion on this point, it would be very easy, he said, to insert in the adoption of the system an explanation of this clause.— Mr. Jay concluded, by suggesting a difficulty on the subject of excise, which had not been attended to— He asked by what rule we should know an article of American from one of foreign manufacture: How could American nails, American porter, and hundreds of other articles be distinguished from those of foreign production? He thought the proposed measure would create embarrassments; and the various abuses, that would follow, might be easily conceived.