To Thomas Jefferson from Joseph Yznardi, Sr., 25 May 1805
From Joseph Yznardi, Sr.
Madrid y Mayo 25. de 1805.
Exmo Señor
Despues de saludar á V.E. y manifestar el reconocimiento de mí Alegria por la feliz reéleccion en V.E. de la Presidencia de ese vasto Gobierno me veo en la obligacion de manifestarle el Sentimiento que me ha causado la noticia de haberse roto las negociaciones con esta Corte segun me acaban de informar, y hé confirmado con la Buelta de Mr. Monroe de Aranjuez a quien me hé ofrecido por si pudiese concurrir en algo qe. alterase su despedida pero este Caballero me há respondido prudentemente qe. su mision habia terminado y dado cuenta, con lo qe. concluyó mi deber en esta parte, pero no el tomar sobre mi mediante el favor qe. V.E. me dispensa creyendo mi honradez y confiando mis desinteresados oficios qe. en todo tiempo concilié á favor de ese Gobierno.
Tenga V.E. la bondad de recordar la complaciencia que tube quando le aseguré que el Cabo. de Yrujo se quedaria en ese Pais, como qe. al no haber sido por la insinuacion de V.E. Jamas lo habria logrado, ni sufrido yo las persecuciones qe. me há hecho en las comisiones prestas á mi cargo desempeñadas con tanta honradez y desinteres; ni tampoco dho Caballero habria variado sus Sentimientos &ca.
Yo Significo á V.E. mi modo de pensar sobre los disgustos qe. ocurren al presente entre los dos Gobiernos: Primero el deslinde de limites del Territorio perteneciente á la compra del Nuevo Orleans, Segundo el de perjuicios sufridos en la Guerra Ultima por los daños de Corsarios y detenciones en las confiscaciones de los Puertos Españoles cuyos resultados deben mirarse imparcialmente con dos respectos, el primero, el de la detencion y condena Arbitraria por los Consules Franceses, y el otro de todos aquellos qe. hayan sido autorisados por los Tribunales de S.M.C. los qe. siempre hé comprendido hallarse dispuesto este Gobierno á compensarlos pero los otros á mi ver los resisten bajo el pretexto de no haber tenido la culpa ni contribuido á semejantes condenas ademas de que comprende el mismo Gobierno de qe. por resueltas de las negociaciones hechas en Paris quando la compra dho de Nuevo Orleans, fueron comprendidas todas las hostilidades cometidas bajo el Pavellon Frances sin explicarse circunstancias cuya obscuridad es la que há movido la question como asi mismo el limite de dho. Nuevo Orleans baxo el pretexto de que la cesion hecha por este Gobierno al Francés no es la misma que esta há vendido al de America, en cuyos puntos se detiene segun estoy informado la final transacion de lo mas esencial de lo qe. vendrá á resultar un disgusto irremediable entre las dos Naciones pero el perjuicio total será evidentemente contra los Estados Unidos sin esperanzas de un resarcimiento qe. no sea muy remoto pudiendo tener las consequencias que siguen.
Con mucha facilidad y sin mayor resistencia los Ests. unidos tomaran posecion del terreno qe. los Franceses le vendieron, y aun si quieren hasta las Floridas pero en recompensa de esto consideraria yo la extension tan dilatada del comercio de ese Pais en todo el mundo, las ningunas fuerzas navales para hacer frente á una Guerra, las leves Esperanzas de tomar ninguna propiedad Española por hallarse totalmente suspenso su comercio y qe. lo qe. fluctuaba está en Poder de los Britanicos y qe. de forzosa necesidad debe la España considerarse como unida à la Francia, y qe. esta por su proprio Interes Sostendra los dhos qe. le paresca convenirle considerando una inmediata Alianza de ese Gobierno con el Britanico, qe. las resueltas serán el Beneficio de su solo Interes y en perjuicio patente de la Neutralidad qe. Goza el Pavellon Americano qe. por todo el tiempo qe. permanesca la Guerra sería el conducto para aprovecharse el comercio Español cuyas ventajas Niveladas con el perjuicio qe. la vulgaridad aparenta Sufrir en no pocesionarse de lo qe. se Solicita no compensará con mucho la excesiva extraordinaria contribucion qe. tendrá qe. hacer en el caso de una declaracion de Guerra qe. veo como indispensable á menos qe. se suavizen las pretenciones, y qual seria el unico medio de permanecer en la Amistad qe. conviene á Ambas Naciones y lo qe. yo represento á V.E. movido de un deseo Sincero nacido de las pruevas cordiales de Pacificacion propias y consequentes á lo qe siempre Ohý de V.E. por quien pido á Dios Gue su importante vida dilatados Años.
Exmo. Señor BLM á V.E su mas Obte Sor.
J. Yznardy
Editors’ Translation
Madrid, 25 May 1805
Most Excellent Sir,
After greeting your excellency and manifesting the recognition of my joy for your excellency’s happy reelection to the presidency of that government, I see myself in the obligation of expressing the feeling that the news of the rupture of the negotiations with this court caused me, as I have just been informed and have confirmed with the return of Mr. Monroe from Aranjuez, to whom I have offered myself in case it can bring about something to alter his farewell. Yet this gentleman has answered me prudently that his mission had ended and is accounted for, with which I conclude my duty in this part, but not for myself, due to the favor that your excellency grants me believing in my honesty and trusting in my disinterested services, which at all times I have furthered in favor of that government.
Your excellency will have the kindness of remembering the satisfaction I had when I assured you that the Caballero Irujo would remain in that country, which, if it had not been for the suggestion of your excellency, I would have never accomplished. Nor would I have suffered the persecutions that have been made against me in the commissions that come with my position, which I have undertaken with much honesty and disinterest; nor would the said gentleman have changed his feelings, et cetera.
I will express to your excellency my opinion about the disagreements that occur at present between the two governments: first, the demarcation of the limits of the territory belonging to the purchase of New Orleans; second, the damages in the last war on account of corsairs and detentions in the confiscations in Spanish ports, the results of which should be looked at impartially in two respects—the first, that of the detention and arbitrary sentencing by French consuls, and the other, all those that have been authorized by the tribunals of His Catholic Majesty. I have always understood this government to be willing to compensate the latter, but, in my opinion, to resist the others on the pretext of this not having been their fault and they not having contributed to such condemnations. Additionally that same government comprehends that as a result of the negotiations made in Paris at the time of the said purchase of New Orleans, all the hostilities committed under the French flag were included without explaining circumstances. This obscurity has motivated the question, as similarily with the limits of the said New Orleans, under the pretext that the cession by this government to the French is not the same as has been sold to America. On these points, as I am informed, the final transaction of that which is most essential is delayed, from which will result an irreparable upset between these two nations; but the total damage will be evidently against the United States, without hopes for compensation, which might not be very remote, and this might possibly have the following consequences.
With great ease and without much resistance, the United States will take possession of the territory that the French have sold them, and even Florida if they so desire. Yet counter to this I would consider the great extension of the country’s commerce with the whole world; the almost nonexistent naval forces to confront a war; the meager hopes of capturing any Spanish properties, given that its commerce is completely suspended, and that what does move is in the power of the British; and that due to forced necessity Spain must consider itself united with France, which out of its own interests will uphold what it considers most convenient considering an immediate alliance of your government with the British, which will result in the benefit of its sole interest and in obvious detriment to the neutrality that the American flag enjoys and which for the duration of the war could be the conduit to take advantage of Spanish trade. These advantages, balanced with the damage that the vulgarity appears to suffer by not taking control of what it claims, will not equate with the excessively extraordinary contribution that it will have to make in case of a declaration of war, which I see as inevitable unless the demands are softened, and which would be the only means of remaining in the friendship that benefits both nations and that I have represented to your excellency, moved by a sincere desire born out of the cordial proofs of appropriate pacification consequent to what I have always heard about your excellency, for whom I pray to God to preserve you life for many years.
Excellent Sir, your most obedient servant kisses the hand of your excellency.
J. Yznardy
RC (DLC); in a clerk’s hand, closing and signature by Yznardi; at foot of text: “Exmo. Sor. Dn. Tomas Jefferson”; endorsed by TJ as received 15 Aug. and so recorded in SJL.
Early in his presidency, TJ asked Yznardi to help convince the Spanish government not to recall its minister, Carlos Martínez de Irujo (Yrujo). Irujo later cast blame on Yznardi for the threat of recall, which had been requested by the Adams administration (Vol. 35:392-3; Vol. 36:4-6).